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The design of large value payments systems is of high relevance for nancial stability.
Payments resulting from interbank transactions are predominantly settled in those
payment systems. Broadly speaking one can classify large value payment systems
in gross and net settlement systems.
In net settlement systems payments are accumulated over a certain period, for
instance a day. At the end of the period osetting bilateral and multilateral pay-
ments are netted and only the resulting balances are settled in central bank money.
Since incoming payments are not nalized during the day, those payments imply an
intraday credit of the receiver to the sender of the payment. Therefore, if at the
end of the day the sender of a payment has too little liquidity to settle all balances
with his counterparties the bilateral and multilateral netting of his payments has
to be unwound and the receiver of the payment will not dispose of the expected
liquidity. If he, as a result, disposes of too little liquidity also his payments need
to be unwound which might again aect the liquidity position of the receivers of
his payments. In this way the liquidity shortage of one bank can generate domino
eects leading to defaults on payments between large parts of the banking sector.
In gross settlement systems, in contrast, each payment is settled in central bank
money one after the other. Consequently, the receiver of the payment has the
liquidity immediately and with certainty at his disposal. The domino eect that can
occur in net settlement systems cannot emerge in gross settlement systems. However,
in order to settle each payment individually banks have to withhold suciently
liquidity. Thus compared to net settlement systems gross settlement systems impose
higher costs on banks because of the higher liquidity buers that those systems
require.
In most developed economies gross and net payment systems coexist for large
value payments. In this paper we study whether this coexistence and the potential
substitution eects between the payment ow in the two types of systems aect
nancial stability. One could presume, for instance, that tensions in interbank
markets that lead to higher costs of liquidity induce banks to send more paymentsthrough net settlement system in order to save on liquidity. However, in times
of tighter money market the probability of a liquidity shortage of an individual
banks seems more likely. This would mean that precisely when the probability of
an unwinding in net settlement systems is large the transaction volume in those
systems is also elevated.
However, in our econometric analysis of the large value payment systems in
the euro area for the period from January 2000 to September 2007 we do not nd
evidence for such a destabilizing substitution eect. But we also do not nd evidence
that banks send more payments through gross settlement systems in response to an
elevated credit risk in the banking sector. Our results rather suggest the opposite
causal relation: In times of a high transaction volume in gross settlement systems
the demand for liquidity seems to increase which leads to an rise in money market
rates. An increased volume settled in net systems, in contrast, seems to bring about
a higher credit risk premia in the interbank market.
In sum, during the relatively tranquil period prior to the current nancial crisis
it were not nancial market prices that drove the choice of the payment systems.
It is rather the transaction volume in the dierent payment systems that inuences
market rates. Thus, generally, the identied mechanisms rather contribute to a
more ecient allocation of liquidity and risk and thereby foster the resilience of the
nancial system. In extreme cases, however, the increase in the transaction volume
in net payment systems and the resulting increase in systemic risk might induce a
hike in the credit risk spread in the interbank market that leads to a rationing of
particularly risky banks in the money market which might make in turn a liquidity
crisis and an unwinding more likely. Moreover, during the crises periods as the most
recent one the severe spikes in money market rates and the substantial increase in
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Settlement Systems - A Concern for
Financial Stability?
1 Introduction
In most countries gross and net settlement systems coexist. While the relative ad-
vantages in terms of stability and eciency of these two types of settlement systems
are well-established when they are standalone, the implications of their coexistence
for the stability of the nancial system have so far been widely neglected. Because
the coexistence of the two systems gives rise to substitution eects, it can lead to
either an amplication or a diminution of systemic risk in the banking sector, de-
pending on whether the substitution buers a payment system shock or whether it
transmits the shock to the rest of the economy through a pricing mechanism. In
this paper we analyze these substitution eects and their drivers.
Net settlement systems incorporate substantial systemic risk. The netting of
bilateral or multilateral payments for a given period at a point in time generates
an implicit credit exposure among the dierent counterparties. A failure to provide
sucient liquidity at the settlement date sets in motion \knock-on" eects. If a
bank holds too little in reserves to settle its balance at the settlement date, all its
payments have to be unwound. If banks that received a payment from the failing
bank are holding just enough liquidity to settle their balances, the unwinding can
also trigger a settlement failure at these banks.
We thank Sylvia Tyroler, Dr. Martin Diehl and Dirk Schrade from the Deutsche Bundesbank
for providing us with the data and detailed information about the institutional structures about the
euro area large-value payment systems, and also Monica Crabtree-Reusser for wonderful editorial
advice. We are also grateful to Heinz Hermann for his comments and suggestions. Nevertheless, the
views expressed in the paper are those of the authors and not those of the Deutsche Bundesbank,
the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland or the Federal Reserve System. We also benetted from
the suggestions, comments, and discussions and seminar participants at the University of Tilburg
and the Deutsche Bundesbank.
1In contrast, real-time gross settlement systems do not generate nancial conta-
gion because in these systems each individual transaction is immediately settled in
central bank money. But this also means that they require a far larger amount of
reserves to settle a given volume of payments. While in a net settlement system
banks have to hold only enough in reserves to meet the requirements of outgoing
and incoming payments over the respective settlement period, banks in real-time
gross settlement systems have to hold sucient reserves for any potential outgoing
payment at each point in time. Thus a trade-o emerges: while net settlement
systems save on required liquidity holdings compared to real-time gross settlement
systems, they carry a larger systemic risk.
In order to improve nancial resilience, central banks in most developed countries
nowadays run real-time gross settlement systems for large-value payments. The cost
of maintaining the larger liquidity requirements that those systems require is thought
to be oset by externalities inherent in net-settlement systems, namely, externalities
that arise in response to the risk of contagion through the payment system, at least
for large-value payments.
However, in most countries, net settlement systems exist alongside the central
banks' real-time gross settlement systems. The net settlement systems are run either
by private banking associations or other private entities. Even though the average
transaction amount is much smaller in the net settlement systems, the total value of
all transactions is a sizable number. The total transaction volume in net settlement
systems of several countries that are part of the European Monetary Union (EMU)
actually exceeded that of their gross settlement systems in some recent periods.
Currently, the net-settlement transactions make up less than half of the transactions
volume (in terms of value), but they still constitute a large percentage of the value
transacted in the EMU.
Understanding the factors that govern which of these settlement systems is used
at a given point in time is important for discussions of nancial stability. The
determinants matter because of the basic trade-o between risk and liquidity costs
across the two settlement systems. In particular, it is essential to see whether there
is substitutability between the systems and if so what its determinants are. For
2instance, one might suspect that in times of liquidity shortages and high short-term
interest rates, banks would have a stronger incentive to save on liquidity and use net
settlement systems more intensely. This means, however, that when liquidity is tight
and banks are more vulnerable to liquidity crises, the shift towards the net settlement
system increases the systemic impact of an individual bank's liquidity shortage. If
tighter money market conditions induce banks to settle payments in the net system
rather than the gross system, that reaction would endogenously increase systemic
risk and nancial fragility. Likewise, there are also good reasons to suppose that
larger default risks induce banks to send relatively more payments through gross
settlement systems. For instance, if a bank that is receiving a payment assigns a
high probability to the possibility that its counterparty will be unable to provide
the liquidity required to clear the transaction, the bank will likely require that the
counterparty settle the payment in a gross settlement system. If the overall default
probability of banks increases, the relative importance of gross settlement systems
could increase. While this eect might partially oset the increased systemic risk
resulting from the higher default probability, it also makes liquidity tighter and
drives up money market rates. This eect in turn can feed a liquidity crisis and
make an individual bank's default more likely.
At the same time, though, the price of liquidity might actually be the result
rather than the driver of the relative importance of gross relative to net settlement
systems. If more transactions are sent through gross settlement systems, the need
for liquidity increases, which would drive up the overnight interbank rate. Similarly,
an increase in the value of payments sent through net settlement systems increases
systemic risk and might therefore lead to a larger credit risk spread in the interbank
market.
All in all, these theoretical considerations suggest that the question of whether
the substitutability between gross and net settlement systems endogenously am-
plies or reduces nancial fragility is an empirical one. In this paper we try to
answer the question for the euro area using a variety of econometric approaches and
applying them to the euro area as a whole and to individual countries in the EMU.
We nd that the neither the price of liquidity nor the credit risk spread in the
3money markets substantially aects the fraction of payments that is settled in the
net settlement system relative to the gross settlement system. Thus banks do not
substitute between the two types of payment systems if the opportunity cost of
using one payment system changes compared to the other. Instead, our results
indicate that it is the transaction volume in the dierent payment systems that
drives market prices. A higher relative and absolute transaction value settled in the
gross settlement system leads to a higher overnight repo rate. A higher absolute and
relative transaction value in the net settlement system is associated with a higher
credit risk spread in the overnight interbank market.
It is important to note that all of our data come from a relatively quiet period,
from the start of 2000 until the end of 2007. Indeed, we feel it is quite likely that
a nancial crisis may induce very dierent behavior than what we observe in the
period covered by our data. Clearly further work that focuses on the dierences
in payments during past crises is of crucial interest in research. However, we also
feel it is important to establish a baseline result of the behavior of the interacting
payments systems during normal times, so that we can determine crisis behavior as
a deviation from this baseline once data become available.
The paper is structured as follows: In the remainder of this section we discuss
the related literature, briey sketch out the institutional structure of the large-value
payment systems of the euro area, and describe our data set. Section 2 discusses
what we can learn about substitution eects from two natural experiments: the clo-
sure of two national net settlement systems, EAF and SEPI. From our analysis of
the eects of these closures, it is very clear that within the euro area the substitution
of payment ows occurs between the net and gross settlement systems of individual
countries but not between the payment systems of dierent EMU member states.
Further, as we nd later in the paper, the substitution seems conned to events that
are perceived to be permanent and large and maybe institutionally driven rather
than incremental developments or small temporary shocks. Section 3 briey dis-
cusses a correlation between the downtime of the dierent gross settlement systems
and the relative transaction volumes settled in gross and net settlement systems.
In section 4 we apply a simple regression analysis to study the contemporaneous
4interaction between the market prices for liquidity and counterparty risk and the
values settled in gross and net payment systems. In section 5 we use the intertem-
poral impulse responses in a FAVAR approach in order to further identify causal
relations. Section 6 summarizes our main ndings and draws some conclusions.
1.1 Related literature
The theoretical foundations of our paper rest on the work of Kahn and Roberds
(1998) and Freixas and Parigi (1998), which develops a model of the main trade-o
between net and gross settlement. Both papers show that net settlement systems
tend to be more ecient in terms of liquidity use while gross settlement systems con-
tain moral hazard, gambling for resurrection, and systemic risks. Gross settlement
systems therefore become more preferable when the costs of reserve holdings decline,
when the riskiness of bank assets decreases, or when the degree of concentration in
the banking industry falls.
However, Kahn, McAndrews, and Roberds (2003) question whether gross set-
tlement system indeed contain systemic risk. They show that even though net set-
tlement systems carry a risk of contagion, they might be stability enhancing. This
results from the fact that net settlement systems do not generate an incentive for
banks to delay the delivery of their payments to the end of the business day in order
to save on their liquidity holdings but instead they encourage banks to reuse incom-
ing liquidity from other banks. Without this incentive to delay, the gridlock eect
is avoided. Kahn, McAndrews, and Roberds (2003) argue that the payments' delay
can in principle cause similar credit exposure and systemic risks in gross settlement
systems. However, they also point out that a delivery-versus-payment approach can
eliminate the incentives to delay in a real-time gross settlement system.
Alternatively, Lacker (1997) Angelini (1998) and Kahn and Roberds (2001) show
in dierent frameworks that costless intraday lines of credit provided by the central
bank can avoid free-riding on the liquidity provision of others and prevent dead-
locks in real-time gross settlement systems.1 However, as Kahn and Roberds (2001)
1See also Minguez-Alfonso and Shin (2009) on this point.
5indicate, collateralized intraday credit lines might not be sucient if banks are con-
strained with respect to collateral. Angelini (1998) shows that the eciency losses
due to the higher liquidity requirements of real-time gross settlement systems as well
as the incentives to delay payments do not increase as the costs of intraday liquidity
rises, but as the overnight interest rate increases.
In sum the theoretical literature suggests that systemic risks that emerge from
the incentives to delay payments in gross settlement systems is small as long as the
central bank provides intraday credit at a zero interest rate and against a broad set
of collateral. This is the case for the National Central Banks in the national RTGS
systems. A basic trade-o prevails in this case: Net settlement systems are generally
more ecient in their use of liquidity while gross settlement systems limit systemic
risk.
In contrast to the bulk of the theoretical literature in payment systems, there is
only little empirical work on the design and stability of payment systems. Schoen-
maker (1995) estimates the expected costs of mutual loss-sharing arrangements that
would be needed to prevent the unfolding of systemic risk in net settlement systems.
He compares those with the higher eciency losses and delay costs that are inherent
in gross settlement systems. He concludes that the eciency gains of net settlement
systems outweigh the expected costs of a failure of settlement.
The only papers to our knowledge that address the implications of the de facto
coexistence of net and gross settlement systems in most countries are Holthausen
and Rochet (2005 and 2006). However, they focus on the pricing of central banks'
gross settlement systems given that they compete with privately run net settlement
systems. Holthausen and Rochet (2005) also consider the provision of the public
good "nancial stability" when pricing gross settlement systems. Rochet and Tirole
(1996) also focus on issues related to the competition between dierent payment
systems. In addition, they also discus contagion eects that may occur between
payment systems and point to the need for coordination between the operators of
dierent systems in order to deal eciently with these externalities.
Beyond that, however, no other paper to our knowledge has yet studied the
apparent implication of the coexistence of the two types of settlement system on the
6resilience of the nancial infrastructure or on nancial stability in general. There is
only one paper, to our knowledge, that looks at the direction of shocks: Our nding
that money market rates are driven by changes in the transaction volume of gross
settlement systems is quite in line with Furne (2000), who reports evidence that
deviations of the federal fund rate are driven by higher payment ows on the same
day.
1.2 Institutional Background
Our study focuses on payment ows in the euro area up until the end of 2007.
Payment systems in the euro area are | and particularly were up to the introduction
of TARGET2 | quite fragmented regionally. This abundance of systems provides
us with a cross-sectional dimension to our data set, as a number of EMU member
countries had both a net and a gross settlement system.
Since the introduction of the euro in 1999 and up until November, 18, 2007,
the central banks of each of the EMU member states ran their own real-time gross
settlement system, and these were linked across the euro area through the ECB's
TARGET.2 While most of these settlement systems included some liquidity-saving
mechanism, like, for instance, multilateral matching, they all shared the main feature
of a gross settlement system in that payments were immediately settled in central
bank money. The largest of these systems was the German TARGET component
run by the Deutsche Bundesbank. Its annual turnover in 2007 was e232 trillion and
the number of transactions it settled was 47.5 million. France, with e145 trillion in
turnover and 4.9 million in annual transactions, had the second-largest component
of the euro area, and Italy, with e42 trillion in turnover and 11.5 million in annual
transactions, had the third largest.
In the euro area, central banks provide intraday credit lines to banks participat-
ing in their respective real-time gross settlement system without charging them any
2In Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain, the changeover to
TARGET2 was only eective on February, 18, 2008, and in Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Italy, and
Poland it was delayed until May, 19, 2008.
7interest. But banks are required to hold sucient collateral with the central bank to
back up the intraday liquidity provision. However, all collateral that is eligible for
the open market operations is generally also accepted as a backup for intraday credit
lines with the national central banks. Since the set of eligible assets ranges from
government bonds, corporate bonds, and mortgage bonds to corporate loans, banks
are generally not constrained with respect to collateral. Thus, incentives to delay
payment delivery to the settlement system are rather limited, which is also reected
in the fact that about half of the daily payments are settled before noon and only
10% of the TARGET trac occurs in the last operating hour of TARGET.3
In addition to these real-time gross settlement systems of the European System
of Central Banks (ESCB), in the year 2000 there were several other large-value pay-
ment systems that were either pure net settlement systems or hybrids. These were
run by the national central banks or by an association of private banks. The most
important large-value payment system in the euro area besides TARGET was and
still is Euro1. Euro1 is a net settlement system run by the European Banking Asso-
ciation | an organization consisting of mainly European banks but also including
banks from some other countries. There are 68 banks directly linked to Euro1 and
67 banks indirectly connected. The overall transaction value in 2006 amounted to
e48.2 trillion. The average value of a transaction was e1,010,000. Before it was dis-
continued in November 2001, the second-largest payment system in the Euro area
was EAF | a net settlement system run by the Deutsche Bundesbank. In 2001
the total transaction value handled in EAF was about 20% smaller than the total
handled in Euro1. Nowadays, the second-biggest net settlement system handling
large-value payments is the Banque de France's PNS. By the end of 2007 PNS han-
dled an overall transaction value of about 30% of the value handled in Euro1. The
average value per transaction in PNS in 2006 was e2,247,000, which was about 11%
of the French component of TARGET, TBF.
In addition, there were two smaller net settlement systems operated by national
central banks. Until November 2004 the Spanish central bank ran SEPI, which had
a monthly transaction value of less than e30 billion in 2004. Thus, the transaction
3See ECB (2008), p.105.
8value handled in SEPI was only about 0.4% of the value handled in the Spanish
component of TARGET, SLBE, and only 0.7% of the value handled in Euro1 during
2004. Slightly bigger and still operated is the net settlement system POPS, run by
the Finnish central bank. The transaction value it handled in 2006 amounted to
e460 billion, which was about 12.5% of the Finnish component of TARGET, BoF-
RTGS, and about 1% of the transaction value handled in Euro1.
1.3 Data set
Our data set contains the daily value of total transactions and the number of trans-
actions settled in the various large-value payments systems of the euro area. As a
measure of the shortage of liquidity, we include the unsecured overnight money mar-
ket rate, the Euro Area Overnight Index Average (EONIA). We obtain the overnight
repo rate, i.e., the interest rate paid on a secured overnight loan, and use the dif-
ference between the EONIA rate and it as an indication of counterparty risk. In
addition, as a further measure of the tightness of liquidity, we use the overall amount
of reserves of the European banking system held with the European Central Bank.
Furthermore, our data set contains time series on the availability of the dierent
payment systems, i.e., the daily percentage of the opening hours during which the
respective system was out of order due to some operational problem. Table 1 gives
some summary statistics for the total daily transactions value and the number of
transactions handled daily in the net and the gross settlement system.
2 The closure of EAF and SEPI - two natural
experiments
The closure of EAF and SEPI on November 5, 2001, and December 15, 2004, re-
spectively, provides us with two natural experiments that allow us to draw some
preliminary conclusions about the substitution in payment ows between the two
dierent types of settlement systems.
9Figure 1 presents a graph of frequencies for the sum of the daily value of pay-
ments settled in all gross and net settlement systems from 2000 to the end of our
series in 2007. A quick glance shows both series to be bimodal. This is the result
of a structural break in the series that occurred on the weekend of November 3,
2001, when the German net settlement system, EAF, permanently shut down. The
histograms for the post-closing period (December 2001 to the end of the series) show
a unimodal pattern, in Figure 2.
The structural break associated with the closing of the EAF settlement system
in both series suggests a long-run degree of substitution between the gross and net
settlement systems that is not surprising. In the three months before the EAF closed,
it averaged e152 billion per day of payments. The other three net settlement systems
taken together averaged about e275 billion per day. In the three months after the
EAF closed, the other three exchanges experienced an increase in their average daily
value of payments of about only e8 billion. In the meantime, the gross settlement
system seems to have had an increase in its daily average of e388 billion over the
same period. It turns out that this was a permanent, one-time increase in the gross
settlement system, which occurred on the day of the EAF's closure. Between the
Friday on which the EAF was operating for its nal day and the Monday on which it
closed, the gross settlement system experienced an increase of e304 billion in value
exchanged, whereas the total net settlement systems experienced a drop of e134
billion. So it seems that the users of the EAF, for the most part, substituted into
the gross settlement system, at least immediately after the shock.4
Figure 3 shows the corresponding histograms for the gross settlement systems
in Germany, France, and Italy, the three largest TARGET components, for each
of the two time periods. These indicate that the short to medium run eect was
similar. It is clear that the EAF volume was taken up only by the German gross
settlement system. The other countries have value distributions that stay fairly
4It is interesting to note here that the decline in the transaction volume of the net settlement
system was far smaller than the increase in the gross settlement system. A reason for this might
be that settling in a gross system requires banks to reallocate more liquidity through the interbank
market which by itself generating further payments.
10consistent throughout the period. So when the EAF closed, not only did all of the
net settlement payments go to the gross settlement system, they also went only to
the German system. At least in the short to medium time horizon, payments seem
to be a local phenomenon.5
Figure 3 also shows the diagram for the Euro1 net settlement system over the
same two time periods. Although there is bimodality associated with its distribution,
it is a bimodality that is evident independent of the sample period. It is related
to the fact that this system has dramatic single-day losses in volume periodically,
which are made up the next day. These drops occur throughout the sample period
and may be related to exchange closures.
Further evidence for the substitution between payment systems after a large
shock is provided by breakpoint tests. Table 2 provides the breakpoints for some
of the payments systems of the euro area, obtained by applying a fairly standard
test for determining breakpoints of unknown date. These breakpoints are reported
for sixth order autoregressive processes of the logarithm of value in the payments
systems, although the results are consistent with other specications. Several points
emerge clearly. First, there was clearly a break in the German gross settlement
system exactly on the date on which the EAF closed. This breakpoint is also clearly
identied in the aggregate time series for payments in the net and gross settlement
systems. There is no evidence of a breakpoint on that date in any of the other time
series | neither in the other national TARGET components nor in the national
net settlement systems. Specically, there is no breakpoint at all identied in the
sample period for the French and Italian TARGET components or for the other euro
area net settlement systems. Surprisingly, for the Spanish TARGET component we
nd a breakpoint at the 90% signicance level for a day prior to the closure of the
German net settlement system, while we have no breakpoints identied at the actual
closure of SEPI | the Spanish net settlement system | on December 15, 2004.
In sum, however, these results conrm that large-value payment streams are not
redirected across borders. Thus substitution eects are likely to be relevant only
for dierent payment systems within one country. However, within a country, there
5See ECB (2006) for a more detailed discussion drawing the same conclusions.
11seems to be a strong substitution eect between net settlement systems and gross
settlement systems. The location of a payment system seems to matter more in the
choice of a system than whether it is gross or net.
This substitution of payment system across systems does not seem to be repeated
for short-term interruptions. As we shall show in the next section, a variable that
reects temporary interruptions in the gross settlement system does not have any
explanatory power for changes in the transaction volumes in the net settlement
system, temporary or not.
3 The eect of short-term disruptions
The basic empirical tests reported in the previous section show that some domestic
substitutability between net and gross settlement systems occurs in the presence of
long-term disruptions. However, in those cases, the disruptions were anticipated;
the closure of each of those payment systems did not come as a surprise, and central
banks and payment system participants had time to prepare.
From a nancial stability perspective, it is more important to know whether
unanticipated short-term disruptions generate substitution eects. To study that
question, we obtained a time series on the daily downtime of the dierent national
TARGET components. Using that series, we investigate the extent to which the un-
availability of TARGET or its components induced banks to switch to domestic net
settlement systems. We calculate the extent to which percentage daily downtime is
correlated with the proportion of transactions sent through each type of system. In
order to do so we aggregate the transaction value sent through all the net settlement
systems in the euro area (NETV AL) and the value sent through the dierent gross
settlement systems (GROSSV AL). A signicant positive correlation between TAR-
GET unavailability and the ratio of NETV AL to GROSSV AL could be seen as a
rst indication that short-run disruptions in the gross settlement system also lead to
more frequent use of the net settlement systems. Such a nding would be important
to the question of nancial stability, because it would indicate that systemic risk
12increases endogenously precisely in times when the stability of the nancial system
is at risk due to disruptions in the main large-value payment system.
However, we do not nd any indication of a signicant impact of TARGET
downtime on the relative importance of the net and gross settlement systems. The
correlation between the daily unavailability of TARGET and the transaction value
settled in the net relative to the gross settlement systems is both economically and
statistically insignicant. The correlation coecient is 0.012 (with a t-statistic of
0.5095 and a P-value of 0.6. ), so it is eectively zero.
4 Contemporaneous eects of tensions in the money
market
Our results so far indicate that there is some substitutability between gross and
net settlement systems for payments, but that substitution occurs only when there
is an anticipated, permanent disruption to service. Given that some substitution
does occur, however, we argue that disruptions in the gross payment system poten-
tially increase systemic risk, since they can increase the volume of payments owing
through the inherently riskier net settlement systems. What we would like to know,
and what our results do not tell us, is whether the observed substitution eect tends
to amplify or mute any increase in systemic risk resulting from tensions in money
markets. If the substitution is driven by tightness in the money markets or by
banks' default probabilities, then the choice of the settlement system might have an
endogenously amplifying or damping eect on systemic risk.
As mentioned in the introduction, it is not clear from a theoretical perspective if
the prices of liquidity and default risk drive the choice of the net or gross systems or
shocks in the payments systems drive the prices. The choice of payments should be
aected by the economic environment, in particular, by the relative price of using
one system over another. Net settlement systems require less liquidity to complete
a transaction, but they involve more default risk than gross payment system. This
suggests measuring the substitution between the two settlement systems based upon
13their response to two prices, the price of liquidity and the price of default risk.
On the one hand, an increase in the price of liquidity will induce banks to send
fewer payments through the system with higher liquidity costs (the gross settlement
system). Holding the price of liquidity constant, an increase in the price of default
risk should cause the users of the net system to substitute into the gross system.
On the other hand, from the perspective of a "general equilibrium" approach, one
might also expect an increase in the demand for liquidity due to more intense use
of the gross settlement system to increase the price of liquidity. Thus depending
on whether the pricing shock in money markets is caused by demand or supply, the
eect can be dierent.
Furthermore, when perceived default risk in the banking sector rises, receivers
of payments will likely prefer being sent transactions through the gross settlement
system, while senders might actually prefer to use the net settlement system. In
times of higher default risk, gathering liquidity in the money markets is more costly
to collaterally constrained sending banks if they have to pay a high default risk
premium in the unsecured interbank market. Consequently, whether gross payment
system volumes increase relative to net volumes in response to an increase in the
default risk premium in interbank markets also depends on whether it is the sending
or the receiving bank that is choosing the payment system.
Thus whether net settlement systems are more intensely used in times of liquid-
ity shortage and high counterparty risk and whether this eect amplies or mutes
systemic risk is an empirical question. To investigate this we analyze the interaction
between the daily transaction volume in the two payment systems and contempo-
raneous daily money market rates. In particular, we measure the price of liquidity
and default risk with two price spreads. We take advantage of the several markets
for liquidity that are alike in most respects, but which dier in specic dimensions.
The rates in these markets vary primarily because of these dierences. The Eonia
is the interest rate in the euro area unsecured overnight money market. Thus the
Eonia reects liquidity shortages as well as the average counterparty risk in the euro
area banking sector. The overnight repo market has the same duration, and because
it is fully collateralized, it represents the counterparty-default- free rate for scarce
14liquidity.6 The marginal lending rate is the rate applied by the ECB on the fully
collateralized standing facility.7 It is the rate at which all banks in the euro area
receive liquidity in any amount against eligible collateral. Consequently, this inter-
est rate measures the price of liquidity that is not aected by temporary liquidity
shortages, which might drive the other two rates. It reects the stance of monetary
policy and allows us to correct the other rates for changes in monetary policy.
As the price of liquidity risk (LIQUIDITY RISK) we use the dierence between
the repo rate and the marginal lending rate (plus 100 bp to center it around zero).8
Our measure for the counterparty default risk in the banking sector (DEFAULT
RISK) is the spread between the Eonia and the repo rate.
A rst indication of the contemporaneous interrelation between our measures of
money market tensions and transaction volume in the dierent payment systems
is given by the correlation analysis presented in Table 3. Here LNETV AL and
LGROSSV AL stand for the logarithm of the transaction value in the euro area's net
and gross settlement systems, respectively. LNET2GROSS is the log transaction
value in the net settlement systems relative to the gross settlement systems.
As Table 3 indicates, there is a positive correlation between our default risk
measure and the absolute and relative values of transactions in the net settlement
systems. This suggests that banks do indeed use net settlement systems more in-
tensely when the spread between secured and unsecured lending is high and it is
costly for collaterally constrained banks to provide enough liquidity. However, the
univariate negative eect on the transaction value in the gross settlement system is
tiny.
6A problem with this rate is that the market was used in volume only after May 2002, so that
a number of our observations in the early part of the sample cannot be used. However, this is
the period where structural breaks were evident as discussed above, so that the empirical methods
that we use do not have to account for them.
7It should be noted that the class of assets eligible for the ECB's repo auctions is broader
than the class of assets accepted in interbank repo transactions. However, this eect of collateral
constraints only drove the dierence between the repo rate and the marginal lending rate during
the nancial crisis from 2008 onwards.
8Thus, eectively the spread reects the dierence between the repo rate and the minimum bid
rate set by the ECB for its main renancing operations.
15A comparison of the correlation of LNETV AL and LNET2GROSS with the
correlation between LGROSSV AL and LNET2GROSS suggests that the relative
importance of the net settlement system is not solely driven by changes in the
transaction value in either of the two systems.
Most surprisingly, though, Table 3 shows that the univariate eect of an increase
in the spread between the repo rate and the marginal lending rate is negative for the
payment volume sent through the gross settlement system. However, at the same
time, a higher liquidity risk is associated with a decrease in the transaction value of
the net settlement system, which even exceeds the decline in the gross settlement
system such that the overall eect on the relative transaction volume sent through
the net settlement system actually declines, too. These univariate results are clearly
at odds with our theoretical assumptions. Neither do we nd that an increase in
the price of liquidity is correlated with a substitution from gross to net settlement
systems, nor do we nd that an increase in payments volume in the gross settlement
systems is associated with an increase in the price of liquidity.
These univariate results of course should not be taken at face value. In particular,
they might be driven by the strong trend in the transaction volumes. So next
we apply an OLS regression to study the contemporaneous eect of our two risk
variables on the absolute and relative transaction value in the two payment systems,
correcting for respective trends in the transaction value in the two payment systems.
Table 4 reports our OLS estimates for the eects of the two risk spreads on the
absolute and relative transaction values settled in the two dierent types of payment
systems. Here D(LGROSSV AL) and D(LNETV AL) are the rst-order dierences
in the transaction values in the two payment systems. The results indicate that there
is indeed signicant growth in the volume of both the gross and the net settlement
systems. The positive trend in the gross settlement systems substantially exceeded
the growth in the net settlement systems such that we observe a strong signicant
negative trend in the ratio of payments settled in net relative to gross payment
systems.
Taking these results into account, our OLS regression still indicates that a higher
default risk premium in the interbank market leads to a signicantly higher trans-
16action volume in the net settlement system. However, our results also indicate that
as DEFAULT RISK rises, the value sent through the gross settlement system
becomes signicantly larger.
The regression results reported in the forth column indicate a further insight.
Since both the transaction value in gross and net settlement systems, are positively
related to DEFAULT RISK, the relative importance of the net settlement systems
does not signicantly increase with the credit risks in the overnight interbank market.
This is in contrast to our univariate results. The dierences in our results suggest
that it is the increase in the transaction value that is processed in both payment
systems that leads to a higher need for liquidity. This forces collaterally constrained
banks to demand more unsecured interbank credit and pay an increasing spread for
it.
Regarding the eect of a change in liquidity risk, we nd that a higher dierence
between the overnight repo rate and the ECB's lending rate is associated with
a higher value sent through the gross settlement system and a lower value sent
through the net settlement system. While individually each eect is insignicant on
the respective transaction value, they jointly lead to a signicantly negative eect
of LIQUIDITY RISK on the ratio of the value sent through net relative to gross
settlement systems. These results now clearly suggest that it is not the price of
liquidity that leads to a substitution from gross to net settlement systems. They
rather indicate that the causality is reversed in that liquidity becomes pricier when
the need for liquidity is increased because of an increased transaction value settled
in the liquidity-intense gross settlement system.
To provide further evidence for this line of reasoning, we switch the endogenous
and exogenous variables and run the reverse OLS regression, explaining the counter-
party risk spread (DEFAULT RISK) and the daily price of liquidity as the spread
between the repo rate and the marginal lending rate (LIQUIDITY RISK) with
the respective daily transaction value in the payments system.Table 5 reports the
results for those regressions.
According to the results in Table 5, the absolute transaction value in gross
settlement systems has no signicant eect, neither on the daily price of liquid-
17ity, i.e., the spread between the repo and the marginal lending rates at the ECB
(LIQUIDITY RISK), nor on the default risk premium in the overnight interbank
market (DEFAULT RISK). In contrast, the eect of a higher absolute transac-
tion value in the net settlement system is signicantly negative on the daily price
of liquidity and signicantly positive on the credit risk in the overnight markets.
While the impact on DEFAULT RISK conrms our previous results, the negative
eect on LIQUIDITY RISK cannot be explained with our theoretical assump-
tions, and it is at odds with our previous results. Regarding the eect of the ratio of
transactions settled in net relative to the gross payment systems, we nd a positive
though insignicant eect on the credit risk in the overnight interbank market and
a signicant negative eect on the price of liquidity.
In sum, we do not nd evidence that scarce liquidity conditions induce banks to
substitute transaction volume from the gross to the net settlement system. Further-
more, we cannot conrm the hypotheses that a higher default risk in the banking
sector leads banks to switch payments from net to gross settlement systems. Rather,
our ndings suggest that banks price in the increase in systemic risk due to an abso-
lute or relative increase in the settlement values sent through net systems and charge
higher credit risk spreads in the overnight interbank market. From that angle our
results all in all suggest that the interaction between transaction volume in dierent
payment systems and spreads in the money markets do not amplify but rather mute
systemic risks.
However, the positive relationship between the default risk and the transaction
value in net settlement systems could also be driven by the substitution activities
of collaterally constrained banks, which try to save on liquidity by using the net
settlement system more frequently when they have to pay a higher spread in the
unsecured overnight market.
All of our results of this section need to be taken with a grain of salt. Identi-
cation is assumed in the sense that the exogenous shocks all are presumed to be
on the side of the quantities of payments in the respective systems. In lieu of more
nely delineated data, either in the sense of time of day transactions, or in the sense
of individual choice of payment system, these assumptions substitute for a more
18convincing structural approach.
In the next section we try to disentangle these relationships further trying to
identify causality along the intertemporal patterns in a vector autoregressive ap-
proach.
5 Intertemporal impulse and responses
To examine the reactions of payments shocks and risk shocks to one another for
horizons longer than a single day, we estimate impulse responses from structural
vector autoregressions (VARs). Part of the challenge of estimating these responses
lies in the fact that the payment systems and the markets for liquidity and default
risks could be subject to a wide variety of economic shocks. For example, a shock
in equity prices might simultaneously aect the prices of risk in the banking sector
and the volume of stock trades, which will change the total value of payments.
Accounting for all of the possibilities that might aect the payment system could
involve a large number of variables. If each were to be included as a separate shock
in a structural VAR, one would quickly run out of degrees of freedom with which to
estimate all of the economic parameters, much less be able to handle the complexity
of ordering the structural shocks for identication purposes. To address this issue, we
follow the suggestion of Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2005) and extract factors from
a large number of high-frequency variables, which we feel might aect payments and
risk prices. These factors are then used in the structural VARs as factor-augmented
vector autoregressions (FAVARs).
A list of the variables used to estimate the factors is displayed in Table 6. It in-
cludes 42 variables representing a wide variety of equity, bond and derivatives prices,
and yields and transaction volumes on dierent exchanges. Some days were thinly
traded in some markets, so data on those days is missing. These values were lled in
for the purposes of estimating the factors using the expectation-maximization (EM)
algorithm of Stock and Watson (2002).
The proportion of the variance explained by the factors is given in Table 7. As
19can be seen in the table, although the number of relevant factors is larger than for
interest rates, most of the variation can be explained with just a few factors. The
top four explain more than 90% of the variance, and the top seven account for all but
about 3% of it. Interpreting factors is notoriously dicult, especially when such a
wide variety of variables is used. However, Table 8 lists the factor loadings for the top
ve factors, and, at least for the rst two factors, an interpretation is straightforward.
The rst factor represents a level variable, which takes a positive weight for every
variable except the long-range bond rate. The second factor represents a spread
between the various money market and bond rates and equity prices and volumes.
In a sense, it could be interpreted as an equity premium. Further factors are less
transparent in what they represent. This is not unusual in factors studies, especially
given the large variety of daily variables used. In the spirit of Bernanke, Boivin,
and Eliasz (2005), we also use the components of the factors which are orthogonal
to the included observed variables within the FAVAR.
Figure 4 displays the impulse responses of a model with three factors, the log
ratio of the transaction value in the two payments systems, and the prices of liquidity
and default risks. The identication of the model is through standard Cholesky
assumptions of the ordering of the shocks. We assume that the shocks proceed
very much in the spirit of what our contemporaneous study indicated: the economic
shocks drive the payments system, which in turn drives the pricing of the risks.
However, the results that we report in this paper are robust to the orderings in some
sense. If we change the orderings of the principal component factors with respect
to the other variables, then little happens, although in some cases, the results have
less statistical signicance. If we reverse the eect of the shocks so that the price
shocks occur rst and then the payments systems is aected, we get results that do
not pass the credulity lter. Indeed, the results indicate that the immediate eect
has the opposite sign than one would expect, with a liquidity price shock causing an
increase in the relative use of the gross settlement system. These orderings would be
ruled out by an implicit sign restriction, so we report the impulse response functions
that follow the Cholesky orderings implied by our previous discussion.9
9An appendix with impulse response functions based on other possible Cholesky orderings are
20The left column of Figure 4 shows the responses to a two-standard -deviation
shock of the ratio of the value settled in the net relative to gross system. As the
gure indicates, such a shock is rather fugacious. Only for the following day does
it have a persistent positive eect. Already on the second day, the shock has no
further signicant impact on the ratio of the transaction values. More importantly,
the eect on the two risk spreads lasts only one day. The price for liquidity, i.e., the
repo rate and the ECB's marginal lending rate, is signicantly positive the day after
a relative increase in the value settled in the gross system. This conrms our readings
of the results from our contemporaneous analysis: Also our FAVAR results indicate
that it is a temporary rise in the transaction value settled in the gross settlement
system that increases ceteris paribus the need for liquidity and leads to a higher
short-term interest rate. Similarly, a relative increase in the value of transactions
settled through net settlement systems leads to a higher default risk spread, i.e., a
higher spread between the EONIA and the overnight repo rate but only on the next
day. This nding suggests that market participants do indeed respond to the higher
systemic risk signaled by the larger transaction value in net settlement systems, and
they charge a higher default risk premium in response. However, both eects are
economically fairly small.
The second and third columns report the impulse responses to shocks in the
prices of liquidity (LIQUIDITY RISK) and the counterparty credit risk spread in
the money market (DEFAULT RISK), respectively. As the two charts in the rst
row indicate, there is no signicant response of the ratio of payments settled through
net relative to gross systems on those market prices for risk. This further conrms
our previous result that it is not the price of liquidity or perceived counterparty
risk in the banking sector that drives the decision to use one payment system or
the other. It is rather the payment volume settled in either system that aects the
dierent spreads. In order to disentangle which of the payment systems actually
drives the respective spreads, we include in a second FAVAR analysis the value
of the payments settled in the two dierent types of payment systems separately.
We use the same ordering in this analysis as in the rst FAVAR estimate. Figure 5
available from the authors on request.
21reports the impulse responses for this FAVAR analysis. The rst and second columns
show the responses to a shock in the transaction value in the net and in the gross
settlement system, respectively. Again the response fades out one day after the
shock. While an increase in the payments sent through the net settlement system
leads to a higher credit risk spread in the overnight market (DEFAULT RISK)
and a lower overnight repo rate relative to the lending rate (LIQUIDITY RISK),
a rise in the value of payments settled in the gross systems has the opposite eect on
each of these variables. It contributes to a lower DEFAULT RISK and a higher
price for liquidity (LIQUIDITY RISK).
Consequently, it is not only the higher need for liquidity due to the larger trans-
action volume in the gross settlement systems that drives up the overnight money
market rates. Apparently, a higher transaction volume in the net settlement system
is also associated with a slightly lower overnight repo rate the next day. While the
former eect is what we would expect, the latter eect is puzzling from a theoretical
perspective.
Similarly, that a larger value of payments sent through the net settlement system
contributes to a higher systemic risk and thus to an increase in the default risk spread
in the money market is fairly intuitive. That an increase in the transaction value
settled in the gross system has a damping eect on the default risk spread in the
overnight money market is less straightforward. One explanation for this puzzling
nding might be that it is driven by greater unsecured overnight interbank lending.
A positive shock to overnight interbank lending leads to a higher transaction volume
in the gross settlement system on the rst day, when credits are granted, and on
the second day, when they are repaid. A higher level of unsecured overnight lending
should at the same time lead to higher systemic risk and thus a higher default risk
spread on the rst day, but to a reduced counterparty risk on the second day when
the unsecured overnight interbank loans are repaid.
Columns 3 and 4 in Figure 5 report the eects of the dierent spreads on the
settlement value in each of the two systems. Again we do not nd any response,
which conrms our previous nding. The price for liquidity does not induce banks
to reduce the volume of payments sent through the gross settlement system nor does
22it increase the transaction volume in the net settlement system. We nd no evidence
that a higher counterparty risk spread aects the volume settled in the net or the
gross settlement system.
The northwest quadrant of Figure 5 seems to indicate that a shock in the net
settlement system will aect the gross settlement system more than the other way
around. However, this is due to the particular ordering of the Cholesky shocks that
are generating the impulses reported in that gure. If we order the shocks so that
shocks to the gross settlement system precede the net settlement system shocks, we
would get a quadrant such as that reported in Figure 6. Note that this ordering
implies that the gross settlement system inuences the net settlement system more
than vice versa. Given that our theory provides no clue as to which shock is likely
to occur rst, the best interpretation for the response functions in Figure 5 is an
agnostic one: the data do not delineate which system inuences the other more.
All that we can deduce is that the systems are intimately connected, and that the
eects of the shocks are felt quickly.
6 Conclusion
All in all, the various approaches that we take in this this paper provide us with a
number of very clear results. The price for liquidity does not aect banks' decisions
to send payments through net or gross settlement systems. We nd no evidence
that during the pre-crisis period in Europe a shortage of liquidity induced banks to
use net settlement systems more frequently or that liquidity shortages amplied the
systemic risk associated with tensions in the money markets as a result. We also
nd no evidence that general credit risk in the interbank market induced banks to
favor one type of payment system over the other.
However, we nd that the changes in the transaction value settled in the dierent
payment systems has an economically small but still signicant eect on the daily
price of liquidity and on the credit risk spread charged in the money markets. In
particular, a larger transaction volume sent through gross settlement systems in-
23creases the need for liquidity and increases the price paid for overnight liquidity. A
larger payment volume sent through the net settlement system increases the credit
risk spread charged in the overnight interbank market.
In sum, these results suggest that the interaction between transaction value in
the dierent payment systems and the dierent prices in overnight money markets
do not amplify the systemic threat from tensions in the money markets. Rather,
our results suggest that prices in the secured and unsecured money market segments
respond to changing transaction volumes and that they adjust eectively to changing
systemic risk and scarce liquidity.
Our results must be interpreted with caution. Our empirical modeling is not truly
structural in the sense that our results are not derived from an explicit behavioral
model of the choice of payments system. Identication in our case is either somewhat
ad hoc, as in the case of our cholesky assumptions governing the FAVAR results, or
implicit, as in our ordinary least squares results. Although we do some robustness
checks of our identifying assumptions, in the case of the FAVAR modeling, for the
most part, our identication is asserted rather than examined closely. To transform
our correlation results into more potent policy implications of causality, a more
structural approach is called for.
Further, our results are derived from data covering a fairly tranquil period in
money markets. Thus our ndings do not necessarily carry over to crisis periods
with severe liquidity shortages and huge credit risks in the banking sector, such as
during the recent global nancial crisis. Studying the interaction between transac-
tion volumes in the dierent payment systems and the money markets in the crisis
period would be a natural extension of our analysis. Extensions of our analysis in
both a more structural direction, and in the direction of examining the deviations of
crisis behaviors from our baseline, call for more data than examined in this paper.
However, we are pursuing this research as data become available.
Our results indicate other additional directions for further research. First, the
theoretical basis of our analysis is fairly loose. A thorough analysis of what deter-
mines banks' decisions about which payment system they will use | given that both
the sending and the receiving bank have access to a gross and a net settlement sys-
24tem | is highly needed. Second, analyzing related micro-data covering individual
banks payments sent and received through dierent types of payment systems would
be important to analyze in greater depth in order to nd the drivers of payment
system choice and further assess the extent to which this choice aects system risk.
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27Appendix
Table 1: Sample statistics for the sum of daily transactions settled in the net and
in gross settlement systems
November, 2001 to May, 2007
Net settlement systems Gross settlement systems
Log(value) Log(volume) Log(value) Log(volume)
Mean 26.2261 12.17628 27.78349 12.26092
Median 26.22733 12.18341 27.77243 12.23287
Maximum 26.82559 12.67217 28.60971 13.00966
Minimum 25.07853 11.49342 27.07343 11.48088
Std. Dev. 0.180286 0.143986 0.155546 0.173012
Skewness -0.92512 -0.30793 0.099343 -0.03547
Kurtosis 7.993696 4.067027 4.15694 4.688742
Jarque-Bera 1681535 8999473 8170314 1693893
Probability 0 0 0 0
Observations 1423 1423 1423 1423
28Table 2: Breakpoint tests
Quandt-Andrews, Maximum likelihood, 15% trim,
null hypothesis-no breakpoints in the sample period,
demeaned sixth-order autoregressive process
Market Maximum likelihood Value Probability
F-statistic: Date of the null
Gross settlements
All EMU 11/02/2001 2.632.303 0.0000
Germany 11/02/2001 5.223.907 0.0000
France 9/13/2004 9.929.660 0.7130
Italy 2/25/2005 1.721.749 0.1242
Spain 11/01/2001 1.802.484 0.0964
Net settlements
All EMU 11/02/2001 2.205.142 0.0245
Paris 6/23/2003 1.549.204 0.2066
EuroStar 7/25/2002 7.154.893 0.9470
Table 3: Covariance analysis
Sample (adjusted): 3/01/2002 to 11/16/2007
Included observations: 1491 after adjustments
LIQUIDITY DEFAULT LNET LGROSS LNET2
Correlation RISK RISK VAL VAL GROSS
LIQUIDITYRISK 1.000000
DEFAULTRISK -0.033277 1.000000
LNETVAL -0.044337 0.038402 1.000000
LGROSSVAL -0.026331 -0.003111 0.502892 1.000000









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































31Figure 1: Gross and net settlements levels, March 2000 to May 2007
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Left chart: Gross settlement systems. Right chart: Net settlement systems
(Frequencies on the vertical axis, log(value) on the horizontal)
Figure 2: Gross and net settlements levels, December 2001 to May 2007
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32Table 6: Variables used in estimating factors that represent economic shocks
Variable Denition
EONIA1W 1-week eonia rate
EBFREUTN Overnight repo rate
EBFREU1W 1-week Repo rate
EBFREU2W 2-week repo rate
EBFREU3W 3-week repo rate
EBFREU1M 1-month repo rate
EONIA2W 2-week eonia rate
DEPOSIT1N Overnight bank deposit rate
DEPOSIT1W 1-week bank deposit rate
DEPOSIT2W 2-week bank deposit rate
DEPOSIT3W 3-week bank deposit rate
DEPOSIT1M 1-month bank deposit rate
DEPOSIT3M 3-month bank deposit rate
SWAP1W 1-week swap rate
SWAP2W 2-week swap rate
EONIA1N Euro overnight index average
BUNDPRICE Short-term bund price
BUNDYIELD Short-term bund yield
EECBDEPO ECB deposit rate
EECBMARG ECB marginal rate









LDJEURSTPI Log(Standard Poor Euro Stocks Index)
LS1ESFNEPI Log(Standard Poor Euro Financial Index)
LS2ESB2EPI Log(Standard Poor Euro Bank Index)
LS2ESINEPI
LS2ESFSEPI
LDAXFOI Log(DAX Futures Open Interest)
LDAXFPI Log(DAX Futures Index)





































34Table 8: Loadings of the rst ve factors
Variable PC 1 PC 2 PC 3 PC 4 PC 5
EONIA1W 0.187881 -0.110562 0.016793 -0.075645 -0.037935
EBFREUTN 0.186166 -0.115545 0.017846 -0.084219 -0.036848
EBFREU1W 0.187708 -0.111754 0.016633 -0.073707 -0.038510
EBFREU2W 0.188318 -0.109728 0.016163 -0.068331 -0.037776
EBFREU3W 0.189109 -0.106001 0.014373 -0.062484 -0.038394
EBFREU1M 0.189987 -0.101399 0.011457 -0.055676 -0.036757
EONIA2W 0.188810 -0.106818 0.015715 -0.069082 -0.037468
DEPOSIT1N 0.183443 -0.115860 0.011830 -0.076717 -0.039539
DEPOSIT1W 0.187777 -0.110294 0.015574 -0.074518 -0.038523
DEPOSIT2W 0.188598 -0.106049 0.015214 -0.072982 -0.038706
DEPOSIT3W 0.188511 -0.102404 0.014867 -0.069138 -0.041732
DEPOSIT1M 0.189988 -0.095813 0.012343 -0.065474 -0.041421
DEPOSIT3M 0.192802 -0.074171 -0.002162 -0.045224 -0.035230
SWAP1W 0.188090 -0.109339 0.016395 -0.073793 -0.038561
SWAP2W 0.189007 -0.105482 0.015685 -0.066920 -0.038729
EONIA1N 0.185119 -0.115858 0.015195 -0.083559 -0.037603
BUNDPRICE -0.059488 0.278551 -0.024987 -0.403974 -0.064246
BUNDYIELD 0.059787 -0.277166 0.024668 0.414045 0.090246
EECBDEPO 0.187298 -0.113798 0.019778 -0.066372 -0.033781
EECBMARG 0.187300 -0.113785 0.019862 -0.066307 -0.033678
BUND10Y 0.060063 -0.275040 0.016214 0.415864 0.078696
LSX5EINDEX 0.161803 0.148397 -0.185502 0.123642 0.044232
LDAXINDEX 0.162123 0.156037 -0.164100 0.123563 0.054277
LCACINDEX 0.155289 0.173744 -0.181640 0.106811 0.029642
LSX5EVOL 0.101350 0.135169 0.257583 0.081643 0.331086
LDAXVOL 0.089547 0.136355 0.306501 0.089038 0.270679
LCACVOL 0.085584 0.050847 0.335679 0.164153 0.247836
LBUNDOI 0.086599 0.248101 -0.065999 -0.060860 -0.030827
LBUNDVOL 0.046676 0.149999 0.242856 0.147486 0.082785
LDJEURSTPI 0.160721 0.167051 -0.168101 0.084822 0.035257
LS1ESFNEPI 0.152186 0.181775 -0.180908 0.092568 0.042873
LS2ESB2EPI 0.145218 0.204837 -0.167224 0.061452 0.045697
LS2ESINEPI 0.157250 0.103340 -0.221709 0.209755 0.045045
LS2ESFSEPI 0.155069 0.194474 -0.139036 -0.012486 0.003798
LDAXFOI 0.079861 -0.021588 0.137134 -0.259483 0.631168
LDAXFPI 0.162279 0.155492 -0.164285 0.123466 0.053883
LDAXFVOL 0.087586 0.198308 0.293192 0.118804 -0.257784
LDAXFVOLPX 0.087586 0.198308 0.293192 0.118804 -0.257784
LSTOXXFOI 0.136822 0.166536 0.046180 -0.320829 0.168996
LSTOXXFPI 0.162408 0.148021 -0.180499 0.122775 0.057340
LSTOXXFVOL 0.119213 0.170442 0.277264 0.036670 -0.249543
LSTOXXFVOLPX 0.119213 0.170442 0.277264 0.036670 -0.249543
35Figure 3: Frequency of log(value) in three EMU countries' gross settlement systems
a. June 2000 to May 2007
b. November 2001 to May 2007
Figure 3 
Gross Settlements, Germany, France, and Italy 
For the two samples 
a. June 2000 to May 2007 
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